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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does the United States Court of Appeals lack
jurisdiction under 28 USC. 5 1292(b) over an
interlocutory appeal where the district court’s
certification of the “controlling question of law” is not
contained in the order to be appealed, as provided in
§ 1292(b), nor in an amended version of that order, as
allowed by Fed.R.App.P. 5(a), but rather appears only in
a separate order entered over ten months later, when a
purported “collateral order” appeal of the same order
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 has already been fully briefed
and is ready for argument?
2. Is it state law or federal law which determines whether
an officer in the United States Air Force was “acting
within the scope of his office or employment,” as used in
28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d), which is defined in 28 U.S.C. 5 2671
in the case of members of the military to mean “acting in
line of duty,” and thus whether a case alleging severe
sexual harassment by members of the military shall be
removed to federal court under the Westfall Act upon
certification of the United States Attorney?

LIST OF ALL PARTIES
The caption of the case in this Court contains the
names of all parties (Dorothy Mackey, David W. Milam,
Travis Elmore, and the United States).

-ii-

I(

TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .......................................... i
LIST OF ALL PARTIES ............................................... ii
INDEX TO APPENDIX ............................................... 1v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ v
PETITION
OPINIONS BELOW .........._.._...........
.:....._..................... 1
JURISDICTION ............................................................. 1
STATUTES and RULES INVOLVED . ........................ 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. Procedural History .............................................. 4
b. Statement of Facts ......._.._....................................8
c. Statement of Lower Court Jurisdiction ............ 10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. This case presents an important and
unresolved question of federal appellate
jurisdiction: whether interlocutory order
jurisdiction exists where the district court
issues a “certification,” many months after an
order has been appealed as kollaterally
final,” that the order presents a “controlling
question of law,” without having included that
certification in the order itself, as provided in
28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b), or in an amended order,
as allowed under Fed.RApp.P. 5(a). ..................... 11
2. The lower courts have wrongly assumed, in
conflict with this Court’s suggestion in
Gutierrez de Martinez, that removal of a tort
case against a federal military member from

...

-lll-

state court to federal court turns on a statelaw rather than a federal-law standard of
whether that employee was acting “within the
scope” of his or her “employment,” that is, “in
line of duty.” ........................................................... 20
29
CONCLUSION .............._.____.........................................

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

INDEX TO APPENDIX
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
Order of District Court (filed Dec. 11,1996)
Order of District Court (entered May 27,1997)
Order of District Court certifying issue
for interlocutory appeal
Order of Court of Appeals denying rehearing

-iv-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Baldwin Countv Welcome Center V. Brown,
466 U.S. 147 (1984) (per curiam) ........................ 18
Burlington Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. --,
118 S.Ct. 2257,141 L.Ed2d 633 (1998) .........22,28
California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co.,
480 U.S. 572 (1987) .............................................. 15
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Core.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949) ....................;........................... 6
Coooers & Lvbrand v. Livesav,
437 U.S. 463 (1978) ......................- ................. 15, 19
Dav v. Massachusetts Air National Guard,
1999 WestLaw 44728 (1st Cir., Jan. 29, 1999) ..... 29
Faraeher v. Citv of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. --,
141 L.Ed.2d 662, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998) .........22,28
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1946) ................. 29
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) ........................... 18
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,
459 U.S. 56 (1982) ................................................ 17
Gulfstream Aerosuace Coru. v. Mavacamas Corp.,
485 U.S. 271 (1988) .............................................. 19
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,
515 U.S. 417 (1995) ..................................... 5, 23, 29
Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1994) .............. 19
Moore v. United States, 48 Ct.Cl. 110 (1913) .............. 24
Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1992) ........ 19
Smith v. Barq, 502 U.S. 244 (1992) .............................. 15
Sorrough v. United States, 155 Ct.Cl. 464,
295 F.2d 919 (1961) .............................................. 24
Thermstrom Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,
423 U.S. 336 (1976) .............................................. 14
Van Cowenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988). ........ 19

-V-

Williams v. United States,
350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam) ............. 21, 23, 29
Constitution, Statutes and Rules:
10 U.S.C. $j893, UCMJ art. 93 ..................................... 28
10 U.S.C. 5 1074a(s)(l) ................................................ 24
10 U.S.C. 5 1076(a)(2) .................................................. 24
10 U.S.C. $5 1201, 1203, 1204, 1207 ............................. 24
10 U.S.C. 5 1561(a) ....................................................... 27
28 U.S.C. 5 1254(l) ......................................................... 2
28 U.S.C. 5 1291 ............................................. 6, 11, 18, 19
28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b) ............................... 2, 7, 11, 12, 15-19
28 U.S.C. 5 1331 ............................................................ 23
28 U.S.C. 5 1346(b) ........................................ 7, 11, 21, 29
28 U.S.C. 5 2671 ................................................... 7, 24, 26
28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d) ............................... 5, 7, 11, 21-23, 29
38 U.S.C. 5 105 .............................................................. 24
38 U.S.C. 5 1110 ............................................................ 24
50 U.S.C.Appx. 8 593(b) ............................................... 24
32 C.F.R.
32 C.F.R.
32 C.F.R.
32 C.F.R.
32 C.F.R.
32 C.F.R.
38 C.F.R.
38 C.F.R.

5 51.3 ............................................................. 27
5 51.4 ............................................................. 27
5 51.5(b)(4),(6) ............................................. 27
part 154, appx. H .......................................... 28
5 191.4 ........................................................... 27
5 728.21(d) .................................................... 24
5 3.1(m),(n),(y) ........................................ 25, 27
5 3.301 ........................................................... 25

Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) .................................................... 12
Fed.R.App.P. 5(a) ................................. 4, 6, 11-14, 16, 17
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ...................................................... 1
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) .................................................. 5, 6, 12

.
*

S.Ct. Rule 13.1, 13.3, 13.5 ............................................... 2
S.Ct. Rule lAl(g)(ii) ..................................................... 10
Miscellaneous:
Army Reg. 600-8-l lI39-5.a (1986) ................................ 25
Brief for the United States, Williams v. United States,
No. 24, Oct. Term 1955 ............................... 21, 26, 28
H.Rep. No. lOO-700,lOOth Cong., 2d Sess.(1988) ...... 25
Annot. (D.T. Kramer), Federal Tort Claims Act: when is
a government officer or employee“acting within the
sopeof his office or emplqvment”forpurpose of
determininggovernment liability under 28 USCA
$ 1346(b), 6 ALR Fed. 373 (1971) ......................... 23
Legislation to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act, Hearing
Before Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Gov’t Relations
of House Comm. on Jud., 100th Cong., 2d Sess.,
serial no. 55 (1988) ................................................. 26
19 Moore’s Federal Practice 5 203.32 (3d ed. 1998) ...... 17
20 Moore’s Federal Practice 8 305.14 (3d ed. 1998) ...... 16
2 Op. Att’y Gen. 589 (1833) .......................................... 24
7 Op. Att’y Gen. 149 (1855) .......................................... 24
17 Op. Att’y Gen. 172 (1881) ....................................... 24
32 Op. Att’y Gen. 12 (1919) .......................................... 24
Annot. (J.F. Rydstrom), Federal Tort Claims Act: When
Is a Member of the Armed Forces ‘Acting in Line of
Duty” within Meaning of 28 U.S.CA § 2671, 1 ALR
Fed. 563 (1969 & 1998 Supp.) .................................. 22
16 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed.
1996) ....................................................................... 18

-vii-

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DOROTHY MACKEY respectfully petitions this
Court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit filed and entered on September 10,1998.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (per Siler, J.,
with Krupansb, J.; Cole, J., dissenting), is reproduced in
Appendix A. The decision is published at 154 E3d 648.
The district court’s unpublished “Order” (a 17-page
memorandum opinion), denying the government’s
motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and
granting the plaintiffs motion to remand to state court,
dated December 10,1997, filed December 11) is
reproduced as Appendix B (Susan B. Dlott, J.). The
district court’s Order dated May 21, 1997, and entered
May 27, 1997, granting in part the government’s motion
for reconsideration is Appendix C.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversing the orders of the
district court was filed September 10, 1998. Appendix A.
The order denying petitioner Mackey’s timely petition for
rehearing was filed October 27, 1998. Appendix E. On
January 19, 1999, under No. A-580, Justice Stevens
granted petitioner’s application for an extension of time
to file this petition to and including March 26, 1999.

-l-

Rules 13.1, 13.3, 13.5,30.1 (1997 rev.). Petitioner
invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
$31254(l).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, FEDERAL
STATUTE, AND RULE INVOLVED
Section 1292 of the Judicial Code provides:
(b) When a district judge, in making in a
civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the
opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order, if
application is made to it within ten days
after the entry of the order ....
28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b).
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides, in pertinent
part:
(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171
[@ 2671-26801of this title, the district
courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages . . for personal
injury ... caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee
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of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. $1346. Section 2671 of title 28 adds:
Definitions
As used in this chapter [I711 and sections
1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term
-“Federal agency” includes ... the
military departments ....
“Employee of the government”
includes ... members of the military or
naval forces of the United States ....
“Acting within the scope of his office or
employment”, in the case of a member of
the military or naval forces of the United
States ... means acting in line of duty.
The Westfall Act amendments to the Federal Tort
Claims Act provide, in pertinent part:
(d)(2) Upon certification by the Attorney
General that the defendant employee was
acting within the scope of his office or
employment at the time of the incident out
of which the claim arose, any civil action or
proceeding commenced upon such claim in
a State court shall be removed without
bond at any time before trial by the
Attorney General to the district court of
the United States .... Such action or
proceeding shall be deemed to be an action

or proceeding brought against the United
States under the provisions of this title ....
and the United States shall be substituted
as the party defendant. ....
Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Petition for Permission to Appeal. An
appeal from an interlocutory order
containing the statement prescribed by 28
U.S.C. 5 1292(b) may be sought by filing a
petition for permission to appeal with the
clerk of the court of appeals within 10 days
after the entry of such order in the district
court with proof of service on all other
parties in the district court. An order may
be amended to include the prescribed
statement at any time, and permission to
appeal may be sought within 10 days after
entry of the order as amended.
Fed.R.App.P. 5(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petition presents two important questions
arising out of the government’s attempt to remove to
federal court, and there to defeat, a civil action brought
in Ohio by a former Air Force officer against her supervisors, as individuals, alleging severe forms of sexual
harassment, including assault.
a. Procedural History
The petitioner, Dorothy Mackey, is a former
Captain in the United States Air Force. She brought suit
in December 1994 in the Montgomery County, Ohio,
Court of Common Pleas against respondents Milam and

Ehnore, alleging that from the fall of 1991 until fall 1992
they subjected her to repeated and severe forms of sexual
harassment while serving as her superior officers. After
the case had proceeded for some 15 months in state
court, the United States Attorney filed certifications
under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d)l. The case
was thus removed to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, where the government
sought to substitute the United States as defendant.
The plaintiff-petitioner promptly filed a motion
for remand to the state court. The government then
moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim on
which relief could be granted, claiming intramilitary
immunity and other defenses. Had this motion been
granted, the result would likely have been a dismissal of
the action under the Feres doctrine (Feres v. United
States. 340 U.S. 135,146 (1950)) and 28 U.S.C. 5 2680.
The district court, exercising its authority under
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamamo, 515 U.S. 417 (1995),
determined that the complaint described conduct of the
defendants which was not ‘within the scope of [their]
office or employment” within the meaning of 5 2679(d)( 1) and therefore ordered that the United States not
be substituted, that the case proceed against the individual defendants, and that it be remanded to state court.
Appx. B (12/10/96 order, filed 12/11/96). The court thus
dismissed the defendants’ motions as moot.
On reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), the
district court declined to revisit its fundamental holding
defining the “scope of employment” under Ohio law as
applied to the facts alleged in petitioner’s complaint.

1SeeStatutesand Rules Involved.
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However, the district court agreed with the government’s
suggestion that discovery be allowed on the true facts
underlying the “scope of employment” question. Accordingly, it vacated its order resubstituting the individuals as
defendants and the order remanding to state court. App.
C (5/X/97 order, entered 5/27/97). Despite having thus
prevailed in part on its Rule 59(e) motion, the government on July 21,1997, filed a notice of appeal from both
the district court’s December 11,1996, and May 27,1997,
orders. By order dated July 31,1997, on concurrence of
the parties, the district court entered a stay of all
proceedings pending appeal.
At about the same time it filed its appellate brief,
which claimed “collateral order” jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. 6 1291’, the government on September 30,1997,
filed in the district court a “Motion to Certify ‘Interlocutory’ Decision for Appellate Review.” The motion
expressly requested certification in order to seek leave to
appeal only the May 21,1997, order (entered May 27)
partially denying reconsideration, and not the antecedent
December lo,1996 order (entered December 11,1996).
The government did not seek an amendment of the May
order to make it appealable, as provided in Fed.R.App.P.
5(a).” By Order filed April 22, 1998, Judge Dlott granted
the certification, in the form requested by the government, on the issue of whether the individual respondentsdefendants were acting within the scope of their employment as determined under the respondeat superior
doctrine under Ohio tort law. App. D. By then, the case

2 SeeCohenv. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337U.S. 541
(1949).

‘See Statutesand Rules Involved.
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had been fully briefed in the court of appeals and oral
argument was about to be scheduled.
On appeal, a divided panelof the Sixth Circuit
reversed. App. A. The division of opinion was over the
proper outcome of the scope-of-employment question
under Ohio law. The court apparently assumed that the
issue of scope of employment, defined in the military
context under the Federal Tort Claims Act to mean “in
line of duty,” 28 U.S.C. $ 2671,4 is to be determined
under state law, even when that question determines
whether the federal court will have jurisdiction under &
$2679(d), because that same phrase incorporates state
law to determine liability under 3 5 1346(b). The
opinion implies that the government applied to the Sixth
Circuit under 5 1292(b) for leave to appeal the May 21,
1997, order, as certified by the district court, App. A5,
although there is no reference to such a filing on the
appellate docket. Permission to appeal is granted in the
opinion. 154 F.3d at 650; App. A5.5 A timely petition
for rehearing was denied, Judge Cole dissenting. App. E.
On motion of the appellee (petitioner Mackey),
the Sixth Circuit by order dated December 14, 1998,
stayed its mandate to allow the filing of a petition for
certiorari.‘

4& Statutesand Rules Involved.
’ The court of appealstherefore did not reach the question of
collateral order jurisdiction under 5 1291. See 154E3d at 850
n.1; App. A.5.
‘The court in fact granted that stayto and including April 6,
1999,to allow for the tiling of a certiorari petition pursuant to
a 60-dayextensionof time.

b. Statement of Facts
Petitioner Dorothy Mackey joined the U.S. Air
Force through the Reserve Officer Training Corps in
1983. By 1991 she had been promoted to Headquarters
Squadron Section Commander of Aeronautical Systems
Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), in
Dayton, Ohio. From the Fall of 1991 until her separation
in the Fall of 1992,7petitioner was responsible for
programs designed to ensure physical fitness and readiness of military personnel. During this period, according
to the complaint, petitioner was subjected to escalating
sexual harassment (including assault) by each of her
immediate supervisors, respondents Cols. David W.
Milam (then Inspector General and Chief of Staff for the
Aeronautical Systems Division at WPAFB), and Travis
Elmore (then Assistant Chief of Staff for Aeronautical
SystemsDivision of WPAFB and Assistant Inspector
General).
Both Milam and Elmore regularly leered at petitioner’s body during debriefings, making particular effort
to ogle her legs even when she sat behind a meeting
table. Each made inappropriate comments toward petitioner. Elmore often referred to petitioner’s breasts,
commenting once that he could see that the cold of his
office was affecting her nipples. Milam referred to petitioner’s perfume and make-up, as well as to her appearance in the skirted version of the military uniform,
asserting “This is what I prefer.” Elmore, after ordering

7The court of appeals’opinion mistakenly statesthat
petitioner left the Air Force in 1994. Shedid seek
reinstatement in 1994. Becausethis casehasso far proceeded
only on the pleadings,the entire statementof facts in this
petition consistsof a narrative summaryof the complaint.
-8-

her to stand and turn in the skirted uniform, stared
directly at her legs and stated, “Very nice, very nice.”
Milam and Elmore also each invaded petitioner’s
personal space. Respondent Milam would stand so close
to petitioner she could feel his breath on her face and
neck. Milam often locked the door when meeting alone
with petitioner in his office. Elmore and Milam each
derided petitioner for her apparent distress, embarrassment or protests in reaction to their misconduct
Milam and Elmore each touched petitioner inap
propriately on several different occasions. Milam often
squeezed petitioner’s arm or touched her back while she
talked. With a smirk, Milam acknowledged to petitioner
that he knew his “touching” made her uncomfortable.
In addition to stroking her arms and shoulders,
Elmore inappropriately placed his hands on petitioner’s
neck, waist and leg on distinct occasions. Once, when
petitioner expressedto Elmore that she was not feeling
well, he approached her and put his hands on her waist,
around her back, thumbs pressing in on her stomach; he
then moved his hands down the front of her pants all the
way to her pubic area, despite petitioner’s protests.
Separately, Elmore and Milam made unsuccessful
attempts to get petitioner to socialize with them. On a
regular Sunday workday, Milam invited petitioner to
watch football any Sunday in his office. Elmore persistently invited petitioner to lunch and out dancing. Ehnore
enticed petitioner to an off-base bar late one night under
a professional pretense. Because of her earlier refusals,
Elmore told petitioner he had her resume and would
review it with her, as she had requested months earlier
when she had begun to contemplate leaving the Air
Force. When petitioner arrived, Elmore had ordered
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food and said he had left the resume in his car. In
addition to touching petitioner’s neck and back, Elmore’s
hands dropped below her waist. During this encounter,
Elmore asked petitioner to “slow dance,” which she
refused. He later tried to prevent her from leaving the
bar by blocking the driver’s side door of her car, insisting
he follow her home, and even telling her he wanted a
night cap at her home, all of which, again, she refused.
Retaliating for her resistance to the harassment,
Milam undermined petitioner’s authority by not taking
requested measures against an insubordinate technical
sergeant under her supervision. Milam attempted to
humiliate her by making inappropriate comments about
her body in the presence of co-workers. When petitioner
reached out for support to a friend who was a civilian
employee, Milam ordered petitioner to cease contact
with that person. He also failed to provide common
professional support by refusing to attend a luncheon
where petitioner was to be honored as a nominee for
“Federal Woman Supervisor of the Year.” Expressing his
displeasure with petitioner’s response to his behavior,
respondent Milam habitually whacked petitioner on the
back while talking, hard enough to knock her off balance.
Respondents’ concerted pattern of behavior
toward petitioner not only disrupted her ability to work
effectively, but also harmed her psychologically and
emotionally, ultimately forcing her to abandon a ten-year
career in the military.
c. Statement of Lower Court Jurisdiction Under
Rule 14.1(g) (ii)
The district court’s jurisdiction was invoked in this
case by removal from an Ohio state court on certification
of the United States Attorney under the Westfall Act, 28
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U.S.C. 5 2679(d)(2). Upon substitution of the United
States as sole defendant pursuant to that provision, the
district court would have had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
5 1346(b)(l). The certification was successfully challenged in the district court, App. B & C, but that court’s
order was reversed by the Sixth Circuit. App. A. The
government invoked the jurisdiction of the court below
under 28 U.S.C. 5 1291 on the basis of the collateral
order doctrine, and alternatively under & 5 1292(b) by
certification of an interlocutory order presenting a
controlling question of law. App. D. This petition challenges the Sixth Circuit’s finding of 5 1292(b) jurisdiction;
the “collateral order” issue was not reached below, App.
A5, and is therefore not ripe for consideration here.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. This case presents an important and unresolved
question of federal appellate jurisdiction: whether
interlocutory order jurisdiction exists where the district
court issues a “certification,” many months after an
order has been appealed as “collaterally final,” that the
order presents a “controlling question of law,” without
having included that certification in the order itself, as
provided in 28 U.S.C. 5 1292(h), or in an amended order,
as allowed under Fed.R.App.P. 5(a).
The court below lacked interlocutory jurisdiction
in this case,because the procedure followed by the
government and the order entered by the district court
did not comply with the clear requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5(a). This Court has long
adhered to the complementary doctrines that grants of
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appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed and that
implementing procedural rules must be scrupulously
followed. The Court should grant certiorari in this case
to establish that these principles apply with full force to
5 1292(b), which grants jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders under specified circumstances.
Because the order the government wished to challenge was never amended to contain the statutorily
prescribed certification, the court of appeals never
acquired jurisdiction to permit this interlocutory appeal.
The district court’s order denying the government’s
motion to dismiss and granting the plaintiff-petitioner’s
motion for remand was filed on December 10,1996, App.
B, and entered as a judgment in the civil case the next
day. On December 24, rather than appeal, the government filed a timely motion to alter or amend that
judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).8 The motion did not
request that the December 10 order be amended under
Fed.R.App.P. 5(a) to contain a certification under
5 1292(b).9 Ruling on the government’s motion, the
district court noted that it had not previously addressed
the respondents’ motion to dismiss on the basis of “intramilitary immunity,” because its judgment had been to

8 The district court’s memorandum erroneouslystatesthat the
motion was filed January31,1997. App. CZ. Were that so, the
motion would havebeen untimely, and likewise the later
notice of appeal. Fed.R.App.P.4(a)(4)(C). The district court
docket showsDecember24 asthe tiling date, however,within
ten businessdaysof the entry of the judgment, asrequired.
January31 was in fact the filing date of the government’sreply
to petitioner’s answerto the motion.
‘See Statutesand Rules Involved.
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remand to state court, where the judge had already
denied a motion to dismiss. However, the district court
stated that it found the state judge’s reasoning in
rejecting the application of the intramilitary immunity
doctrine persuasive, and declared that it would adopt
that analysis. App. C3.
The district court further agreed, in the reconsideration order, that in ruling on the motion for remand it
should have considered the government’s conditional
request for an evidentiary hearing to test the averments
of the complaint insofar as they bore on the scope of
employment question.rO In an order dated May 21, 1997
(filed May 23 and entered May 27,1997), the court therefore vacated the order for remand and allowed discovery
in anticipation of a hearing. App. C4-7.
Again the government did not seek amendment of
the district court’s order under Rule S(a) to include a
certification that any of the issues decided were “controlling questions of law” warranting allowance of an interlocutory appeal. Instead, nearly two months later, on
July 21, 1997, claiming that the December 11 and May 27
orders were collaterally final, the government filed a
notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit.ll Over two months

lo Suchhearingsare appropriate where the court hasruled
that the complaint’s avermentson their face take the
defendants’conduct outside the scopeof their employment,
eventhough the U.S. Attorney hascertified otherwise.
Obviously,the governmentcould not ensureits employeesthe
benefit of Westfall Act protection if substitution of the United
Statesasdefendantcould be defeatedby the plaintiffs skill in
pleading alone.
l1 Consistentwith its claim of collateral finality only, the
governmentpointedly did not appealfrom the judgment the
-13-

after that, on September 30,1997 -- the very eve of filing
its opening brief on appeal -- the government filed a
motion in the district court captioned “Motion to Certify
‘Interlocutory’ Decision for Appellate Review.” This
motion requested certification so as to seek leave to
appeal the May 21, 1997, order (entered May 27)
partially denying reconsideration; the motion made no
reference to the antecedent December 10, 1996, order
(filed December l&1996, as was a judgment). Again,
the government did not seek an amendment of the order
it wished to appeal, as provided in Fed.R.App.P. S(a).
By Order filed April 22, 1998, over petitioner’s
objection, the district judge granted certification for
interlocutory appeal, in the form requested by the
government, of the issue whether the individual
respondents-defendants were acting within the scope of
their employment as determined under the respondeat
superior doctrine under Ohio tort law (assuming they
committed the acts alleged in the complaint). App. D.
By then, the case had been fully briefed in the court of
appeals, including the question of whether there was
“collateral order” jurisdiction, and oral argument was
about to be scheduled. The government may have filed
with the Sixth Circuit an application for permission to
appeal, although no indication of such a filing appears on
the docket.12 The court of appeals did not assign a new
(cont’d)
district court had entered, but rather from the hvo orders. Cf.
Thermstrom Products,Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,423 U.S. 336,
352-53(1976) (orders remanding to state court are neither
“final” nor “collateral” under 8 1291).
l2 The governmentdid servea copy of sucha petition on
petitioner’s counsel,however. Petitioner doesnot seemto
havecontestedjurisdiction under 5 1292(b)below.
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docket number, but seemsto have referred the matter to
the merits panel which was about to hear the purported
collateral order appeal. In its published opinion, the
court granted the necessarypermission, App. A5, and
addressed only the question certified by the district court
In permitting the appeal and reaching the merits,
the court of appeals acted without jurisdiction, because
the district court never complied with Fed.R.App.P. 5(a).
As a result, the order given review did not contain the
statement required by 28 U.S.C. $1292(b), and the
petition to the circuit (if filed at all) was not filed within
the required time from the entry of the specified kind of
order. Grants of federal appellate jurisdiction must be
strictly construed, California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,579 (1987), and the applicable
procedural requirements are to be scrupulously followed.
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244,248 (1992); see Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,474 (1978). This Court
should grant certiorari to establish that these principles
apply fully to interlocutory appeals by permission under
28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b).
Section 1292(b) provides that:
m
a district judge, in making in a civil
action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion
that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals which would have juris-
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diction of an appeal of such action may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order, if
application is made to it within ten davs
after the entrv of the order ....
(emphasis added). Further clarifying and elaborating the
procedures to be followed, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state:
An appeal from an interlocutorv order
containing the statement prescribed by 28
U.S.C. 5 1292(b) may be sought by filing a
petition for permission to appeal with the
clerk of the court of appeals within 10 days
after the entrv of such order in the district
court .... An order may be amended to
include the prescribed statement at anv
time, and permission to anneal mav be
sought within 10 davs after entrv of the
order as amended.
Fed.R.App.P. 5(a) (emphasis added). The statute and
rule, read together, are perfectly clear. If the district
judge includes in the interlocutory order the certification
language prescribed by § 1292(b), then an aggrieved
party may promptly (within ten days) seek permission
from the court of appeals to appeal.
As stated in Rule 5(a), if an interlocutory order
does not contain the required language, but a party
wishes to seek an interlocutory appeal, the party must
move to amend the 0rder.l” There is no provision for the
l3 This may be done “at any time,” although tardinessin
seekingcertification may bear on the exerciseof discretion
whether to grant the motion to amend. 20 Moore’s Federal
Practice5 305.14[1],at 305-12(3d ed. 1998). Apparently, the
order could also be amendedsuasponte.
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issuance of a separate order of certification. “In this
situation it appears that the court must issue an amended
order adding only the certifications” 19 Moore’s Federal
Practice 5 203.32[1], at 203-96.1 to -97 (3d ed. 1998). If
the motion to amend is granted, the ensuing petition
seeks permission to appeal the interlocutory order, as
amended, and must be filed within ten days. The reason
for the rule is apparent: the petition under § 1292(b)
servesthe function of a notice of appeal, and like a notice
it must be filed within a specified, short, jurisdictional
period of time after entry of the order to be appealed.
Because the government never sought to have the order
it wished to challenge amended, and that order never was
amended to contain the prescribed certification, no
petition was filed in this casewithin ten days of the entry
of the challenged order, either in its original form or as
amended. The court of appeals therefore never acquired
jurisdiction to allow this appeal.
The district court’s certification was contained in
an independent order, App. D, not in an amendment of
the order the government sought to challenge (which is
App. C), as required by Rule 5(a).14 As a result, a
government petition for permission to appeal was not
filed within ten days of the entry of the order sought to be
appealed, as required by both the statute and the rule.
The court of appeals accordingly lacked jurisdiction to
grant the petition (if one was filed) and to decide the

l4 The reasonthe respondentsfailed to comply with the
mandatedproceduremay be that the order in question was
alreadyunder appeal,and it is well establishedthat the district
court lacksjurisdiction to alter or amend an order that is the
subjectof a pending appeal. Griaasv. Provident Consumer
Discount Co.,459 U.S. 56,58 (1982).
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appeal under 5 1292(b). 16 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 5 3929, at 376 (2d ed. 1996); see Baldwin County
Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,161 (1984) (per
curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting).‘s
The court of appeals’ decision cannot be salvaged
__at least not in this Court -- by reference to the
collateral order doctrine under 28 U.S.C. 5 1291, as
initially invoked by the government. The court of
appeals did not address this alleged alternative ground of
jurisdiction, App. A.5; this Court, if it agrees that
5 1292(b) jurisdiction was lacking, should therefore at
most remand for further consideration. Alternatively,
the Court might simply dismiss the alternative jurisdictional claim under 5 1291 as plainly without merit. The
original December 11, 1996,judgment remanding the
case to state court ended this case on the merits in
federal court and may have been appealable on that
basis, but the government did not appeal; rather, it

ls In addition to the untimelinessof the respondents’petition,
the record raisesanother question about the court of appeals’
§ 1292(b)jurisdiction. The only order soughtto be appealed
in the government’smotion for certification (as in its draft
petition for permissionto appeal,as servedon petitioner’s
counsel)was the May 27,1997,order granting reconsideration
in part and denyingit in part. The question addressedby the
court of appeals--whether the conduct describedin the state
court complaint waswithin the scopeof the defendants’
employment under Ohio law--was not decidedin the May
order, however;on that ruling, the latter order merely refused
to reconsider. For this reasonaswell, the court of appeals
may haveexceededits jurisdiction under § 1292(b)when it
decidedthe government’sappeal. SeeFomanv. Davis,371
U.S. 178(1962).
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sought reconsideration. As a result, the judgment was
rendered nonfinal by the district court’s agreement to
allow discovery and then a hear& on whether the individual defendants, although accused of acting outside the
scope of their employment, had actually not done so, and
so were entitled to Westfall Act protection. App. C. An
appeal could then be brought only if the order was collaterally final, but it was not.
The notice of appeal filed in July 1997 (as
opposed to any 5 1292(b) petition in April 1998) did
reference, and thus bring before the court of appeals,
both the December 1996 and May 1997 orders, including
the decision on scope of employment. But those rulings
cannot reasonably be described as separate from and
unrelated to the merits (respondents’ conduct being at
the heart of the scope issue, also), nor as having conclusively determined the question of scope of employment in
the case,which are both requirements of the collateral
order doctrine. Van Cowenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S.
517,529 (1988); Gulfstream Aerospace Corn. v. Mavacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271,276 (1988); Coopers &
Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468-69. Hence, the decision of the
court of appeals addressed an order which was not collaterally final. &, Jamison v. Wilev, 14 F.3d 222, 230-31
(4th Cir. 1994); Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929,936-38
(3d Cir. 1992). The court below lacked jurisdiction under
5 1291,just as it did under 51292(b).
For all these reasons, this Court should issue a
writ of certiorari to review and address the jurisdictional
defects in the court of appeals’ review of the district
court’s order refusing to reconsider the order determining under the law of Ohio that petitioner’s complaint
described conduct not falling within the scope of respondents’ federal employment.
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2. The lower courts have wrongly assumed, in conflict
with this Court’s suggestion in Gutierrez de Martinez,
that removal of a tort case against a federal military
member from state court to federal court turns on a
state-law rather than a federal-law standard of whether
that employee was acting “within the scope” of his or her
“employment,” that is, “in line of duty.”
The courts below, like virtually all other federal
courts, have mistakenly assumed that the scope-ofemployment judgment they must exercise in reviewing a
Westfall Act certification under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)16
requires exclusively the application of state rather than
federal law. Because that critical error is based on a
misreading of this Court’s casesand of the controlling
statute, this Court should grant certiorari in order to give
guidance to the lower courts on this recurring and critically important question.
The Westfall Act, passed in 1988 to grant federal
employees even greater personal protection from suit
than they already enjoyed, and in particular to override
the holding of this Court in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S.
292 (1988), states that:
Upon certification by the Attorney General
that the defendant employee was acting
within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of
which the claim arose, any civil action or
proceeding commenced upon such claim in
a State court shall be removed . . to the

I6 -SeeStatutesand Rules Involved.
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district court of the United States ....
[There,] the United States shall be
substituted as the party defendant.
28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d)(2). The case is then handled as one
under the Tort Claims Act.
Subject to a variety of exceptions and defenses,
the RCA waives sovereign immunity so as to allow suits
directly against the government for:
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. 5 1346(b). The Westfall Act, while echoing the
FTCA’s “scope of employment” language, does not
couple it with the “under circumstances ... in accordance
with the law of the place” qualification.
In 1955, this Court summarily decided that under
the plain language of 5 1346(b), state not federal law
controls the question of the government’s liability for the
acts of its employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
even when the federal worker for whose acts the govemment might be held liable was a member of the military.
Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per
curiam).” The same phrase -- “acting within the scope of

I7 That decisionwas renderedagainstthe position of the
Solicitor General that a uniform federal standardwasboth
necessaryand consistentwith the statute. Brief for the United
States,No. 24, Oct. Term 1955,at 35-36. It is not necessaryin
the presentcaseto revisit the question whether Williams was
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his office or employment” -- is used in the Westfall Act,
28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d)(l), for a different purpose: to
determine when the federal court must assumejurisdiction and the United States shall be substituted as the sole
defendant. Notably, when used in 5 2679(d), the “scope
of office or employment” language is used without the
accompanying phrase, “in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred,” as found in
5 1346(b). Nevertheless, the lower federal courts,
virtually without exception, have assumed, as did the
court below, that this jurisdictionally-determinative issue
in Westfall Act casesis to be decided solely by reference
to state law. See hot.
(J.F. Rydstrom), Federal Tort
Claims Act: When Is a Member of the Armed Forces
“Acting in Line of Duty” within Meaning 0128 U.S.C.A.
§ 2671,l ALR Fed. 563 (1969 & 1998 Supp.).
This case illustrates the bizarre situation in which
vagaries of a state’s agency law can determine whether
the federal court sitting in a given district has jurisdiction
(cont’d)
correctly decided, asdiscussedbelow, if a minimum federal
standardis applied to the “line of duty’T’scopeof employment”
question under § 2679(d), then 5 1346(b)will never be invoked
in the case. Nevetheless,petitioner would be remiss if shedid
not invite reconsiderationof Williams, pointing out that the
decision in that casewas issuedliterally without a word of
explanatoryanalysis. Moreover, just last Term, in the Title
VII context, this Court eloquently elaboratedthe reasonswhy
federal employment discrimination laws should implement
uniform, national standardsof reswndeat suncrior
determined as a matter of federal law, without varying from
state to state. SeeBurlinston Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. --, 118 S.Ct.2257,2265-67,141L.Ed.2d 633,648-X1
(1998);Faraaherv. Citv of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. --, 141
L.Ed.2d 662,679-85,118S.Ct.2275,2285-90(1998).
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over a case and whether the United States government
may or may not be sued. This Court has already
suggestedthat the perception of the lower courts
(followed in the courts below), that state law supplies the
rule of decision under 8 2679(d), is incorrect. In
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamasno, 51.5U.S. 417 (1995),
the plurality, without citing Williams, called the Westfall
Act scope-of-employment determination for removal and
substitution purposes a “federal question.” 515 U.S. at
435. The dissenters did not disagree.@ The lower
federal courts, including the courts below, have apparently assumed they are bound by Williams to use state
law in this fundamentally different context See App. A,
B, see generallv Annot. (D.T. Kramer), Federal Tort
Claims Act: when is a government officer or employee
“acting within the sope of his of&e or employment” for
purpose of determininggovernment liability under 28 USCA
5 1346(b), 6 ALR Fed. 373 (1971). This Court should
grant certiorari to examine this important question, and
to clarity that at least when some peculiarity of a state’s
application of the law of agency conflicts with a fundamental aspect of federal policy, as it does here, the
federal rule must control.
The lower courts’ assumption about the controlling authority of state law in the context of Westfall Act
certifications is all the more dubious in the case of
military defendants in state court suits, for whom

‘s Without evenhinting that “scopeof employment” might be a
state law issue,the four Gutierrez dissentersviewed it as
merely a questiongoing to jurisdiction and thus not a “federal
question”under 28 U.S.C.§ 1331. 515 U.S. at 441-42. Justice
O’Connor, concurring,did not commenton the issue.I&. at
437-38.
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Congress specially provided in 28 U.S.C. 8 2671 that
“scope of employment” means “in line of duty,“‘” a
uniquely federal concept with a long history of statutory
usage and judicial construction in the context of military
benefits determinations. See, s
IO U.S.C. 55 1074a(a)(l), 1076(a)(2)(C), 1201,1203,1204; 38 U.S.C. s 1110,
50 U.S.C.Appx. 5 593(b)(3). In that context, to fulfill the
remedial purposes of such legislation, the scope of the
phrase is very broad. See 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 12 (1919); 7
Op. Att’y Gen. 149 (1855).
Yet even in that generous setting, there is a fixed
star of limitation: an injury or disability which is due to
the servicemember or veteran’s own willful misconduct is
never viewed as incurred “in line of duty.” As provided in
10 U.S.C. 5 1207, “Each member of the armed forces who
incurs a physical disability ... that resulted from his intentional misconduct ... shall be separated from his armed
force without entitlement to any benefits under this
chapter.” Likewise as to veterans, under 38 U.S.C. 5 105,
an “injury or disease incurred during active military,
naval or air service” cannot be “deemed to have been
incurred in line of duty” if it resulted from “the veteran’s
own misconduct ...? The Attorney General has repeatedly recognized this invariable limiting principle. See 32
Op. Att’y Gen. 12 (1919); 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 172 (1881);
2 Op. Att’y Gen. 589 (1833). So has the Court of Claims.
Sorrouzh v. United States, 155 Ct.Cl. 464,295 F.2d 919
(1961); Moorev. United States, 48 Ct.CI. 110 (1913).
The military and veterans’ departments agree with
this limitation. See. e.&, 32 C.F.R. 5 728.21(d) (“line of

lg Section2671of title 28 is reproducedin the Statutes
Involved.
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duty” rule for reservists’ medical and dental care eligibility; expressly excluding conditions “incurred as a result
of the reservist’s own misconduct”); 38 C.F.R. 3 3.1(m)
(definition of “in line of duty” for purpose of eligibility for
veterans’ benefits; excludes “result of the veteran’s own
willful misconduct”), id.(n) (defining “willful misconduct”
as requiring “conscious wrongdoing or known prohibited
action”), id.@)(4) (eligibility of former prisoners of war
limited if detention or internment “was the proximate
result of the serviceperson’s own willful misconduct”); 38
C.F.R. § 3.301(a) (defining “line of duty” for purposes of
basic entitlement to veterans’ benefits, excluding casesof
death or disability resulting from “veteran’s own willful
misconduct”), accord, id.(b). Likewise, the Army regulation governing the conduct of “line of duty investigations”
sets forth as one of its basic principles that “Injury or
diseaseproximately caused by the member’s intentional
misconduct or willful negligence is ‘not in LD -- due to
own misconduct.“’ AR 600-8-l lI39-5.a (1986).
The House Committee on the Judiciary, after
holding bearings on the Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the “Westfall Act”) reported to the House -- without reference to
the law of any particular state -- that under those amendments the “scope of employment” limitation included
“common law torts,” but that “If an employee is accused
of egregious misconduct, rather than mere negligence or
poor judgment, then the United States may not be substituted as the defendant, and the individual employee
remains liable.” H.Rep. No. 100-700, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess.5 (1988). Requested during the bearing to provide
examples of situations where the Attorney General
would not certify a federal worker’s alleged misconduct
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as being ‘within the scope” of his or her employment, the
Department provided a list of nine examples from
published cases,three of which involved sexual misbehavior. Legislation to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act,
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Gov’t
Relations of House Comm. on Jud., 100th Cong., 2d
Sess.,serial no. 55, at 129-30 (1988).
The Solicitor General has not hesitated to
acknowledge the same limitation before this Court.
Discussing the meaning of the term “line of duty” in 28
U.S.C. $2671, as a special definition of “scope of employment” under the FTCA, the government explained:
Congress has expanded the ‘line of duty’
concept in such legislation [granting benefits
to servicemembers or their dependents] to
reward them for the sacrifices caused by their
separation from civilian life and for the
understandable and desirable purpose of
making benefit payments to such servicemen
and their dependents in all situations except
where the injury or death (1) was the
proximate result of the serviceman’s own
misconduct ....
Brief for the United States, Williams v. United States,
No. 24, Oct. Term 1955, at 17.20 If a particular state
chooses to treat willful misconduct as being within the
scope of a person’s employment under that state’s own
law,‘l that doctrine cannot be accepted under the

z” The Williams brief was filed by Solicitor General (later
Judge)Simon E. Sobeloff, and co-signedby AssistantAttorney
General Warren E. Burger.
” It is by no meansclear, notwithstanding the decision below,
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Westfall Act -- certainly not in a casewith a military
defendant -- without defeating a fundamental Congressional understanding of the Act’s coverage, and the
firmly-settled meaning of its terms, nor without defeating
the limitations that the national military departments
have placed on the benefits available to their members
for almost 200 years. Indeed, if a uniform “willful
misconduct” exclusion is not read into 8 2671’s use of the
term “line of duty,” it is difficult to see what that statute
adds to the “scope of employment” limitation found in 5
2679, which in turn must be read as incorporating, in all
cases,at least an “egregious misconduct” limitation.
As noted in 38 C.F.R. 8 3.1(n), the concept of
“willful misconduct” in the military context must include
not only “conscious wrongdoing” but also “known prohibited action.” This bipartite standard follows, if nothing
else, from the culture of obedience that is necessaryto
the successof the military mission. That obedience must
include compliance with the military departments’ strong
and unequivocal stands against sexual harassment and
abuse by superior officers. 10 U.S.C. 5 1561(a)
(Congressional mandate that military is to investigate
complaints of sexual harassment); 32 C.F.R. 9 51.4
(policy to eliminate sexual harassment), &J. 5 51.3 (definition, including conduct like that alleged by petitioner), id.
§ 51.5(b)(4),(6), &J. 5 191.4(f) (elimination of sexual
harassment by civilian employees of military); 32 C.F.R.
(cont’d)
that Ohio is sucha state. The Ohioan district judge, analyzing
Ohio law, ruled that the respondents’conduct,asallegedin
the complaint, wasoutside the scopeof their employment,
App. B, and the dissentingOhioan federal circuit judge
agreed. App. AlO-A18. The 2-1 decisionbelowwas authored
by a Kentuckian. SeeApp. Al.
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part 154, appx. H (sexual harassment is form of “sexual
misconduct” which is disqualifying for receiving security
clearance for sensitive classified material); cf. 10 U.S.C.
5 893, UCMJ art. 93 (maltreatment, including severe
sexual harassment, is military crime).
Under all these laws and policies, it could not be
more clear that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not
in “line of duty” or “within the scope of [military] employment,” because it is a form of “willful misconduct.” As
the Solicitor General argued in Williams:
[Clertainly where, as here, the regulations
reveal that a particular activity is definitely
not beneficial to the service and is not to be
undertaken, a court would not be justified in
holding the serviceman to be within his
employment while carrying on that precise
activity ....
Brief for the United States, Williams v. United States,
No. 24, Oct. Term 1955, at 35. This conclusion is the
same one that the Court reached last year and declared
in the context of national employment law. “The general
rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not
conduct within the scope of employment.” Burlineton
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. --, 118 S.Ct. 2257,
2267, 141 L.Ed.2d 633,650 (1998); Faragher v. Citv of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. --, 141 L.Ed.2d 662,679-85,118
S.Ct. 2275,2285-90 (1998). This Court should grant the
requested writ of certiorari to settle this important point,
as it applies to control the federalization of a lawsuit
under the Westfall Act, and to correct the Sixth Circuit’s
erroneous invocation and questionable interpretation of
Ohio’s law of agency, which it applied to defeat the peti-
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tioner’s right to have her day in court against the individual respondents.22
The question whether the use of state law to
determine the scope of liability, as provided in 28 U.S.C.
5 1346(d), also requires the use of state law to determine
federal court jurisdiction under 5 2679(d) is an important
question, worthy of this Court’s consideration, particularly in view of the possible conflict between the decision
in Williams and the language of Gutierrez de Martinez.
Petitioner Mackey’s instant petition should be granted.
CONCLUSION
The court below erred in reversing the district
court and holding that on the facts alleged in petitioner’s
complaint, the defendants-respondents acted within the
scope of their employment under Ohio law, and thus “in
line of duty” under the Westfall Act, when they sexually

u In correctingthe error below, the Court should also
disapprovethe circuit’s reachingout, in an advisoryopinion
that went beyondthe boundsof dictum, to announcethat the
doctrine of intramilitary immunity would apply to require
dismissalof this caseon remand. App. A9. That questionwas
not then before the court of appealsand is not presentedhere.
Whether the u
doctrine (Feresv. United States,340 U.S.
135 (1946))shouldbe exoandedto coversuits not only against
the governmentin federal court, but also againstindividual
former military supervisorsin state court, was not before the
court below on the 5 1292(b)interlocutory appeal it accepted,
(The district court did not reach it in the December 1996
order, but “adopt[ed] the reasoning”of the state trial judge’s
ruling on the questionwhen ruling on reconsideration. App.
C3.) The questionis a controversialone, on which courtshave
differed. SeeDav v. MassachusettsAir National Guard, 1999
WestLaw44728(1st Cir., Jan. 29,1999).
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abused and harassed her whiIe acting as her superior
officers in the Air Force. For the foregoing reasons, petitioner DOROTHY MACKEY prays that this Court
grant her petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
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Before: KRUPANSKY, SILER, and COLE, Circuit
Judges. SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which KRUPANSKY, J., joined. COLE, J. (pp. 652655), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
SILER, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, Dorothy Mackey, initially filed this action in
Ohio state court alleging that defendants, David W.

Milam and Travis Elmore, her superior officers in the
United States Air Force, sexually harassed her. The
Department of Justice authorized representation of
Milam and Elmore, and the case was removed to federal
court with the United States substituted as defendant.
The district court, however, determined that under applicable Ohio law, Milam and Elmore were not acting
within the scope of their employment when they allegedly
sexually harassed Mackey. It therefore rejected substitution of the United States as defendant and remanded the
case to the Ohio state court. On the United States’s
motion, the district court certified its scope of employment decision for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 5 1292(b). For the reasons that follow, we find
that Milam and Elmore were acting within the scope of
their employment and therefore REVERSE the district
court’s order.
I.
Mackey was a Captain in the Air Force. Milam and
Elmore were her two immediate superior officers during
the times in question. Mackey alleges that on several
occasions, Milam and Elmore made inappropriate sexual
advances toward her.
In her complaint, Mackey states that at their first
meeting, Milam locked the door to his office while she
was alone with him. He often “ogled” her and made
comments when she wore her skirted uniform. He also
stood very close to her and inquired about her perfume
and make-up. Milam also engaged in “unwanted
touching” and made sexual comments in her presence.
Mackey made even more serious allegations against
Elmore in her complaint. She alleged that he often stared
at her breasts and made comments about her slender
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waist and her appearance in the skirted uniform. During
meetings, he leaned back in his chair so that he could see
under the table when she wore her skirted uniform.
During one meeting, after Mackey’s neck popped,
Elmore began massaging her neck. On another occasion,
he began touching her ankle and legs after she injured
her knee. At another time, he placed his hands around
her waist in order to “measure” it. During one meeting,
Mackey commented that she was not feeling well. At
that point, Elmore began replicating a pelvic exam by
moving his hands down Mackey’s stomach. Finally,
Elmore invited Mackey to a local bar late one evening
for the stated purpose of working on her resume. She
met him at the bar, but when she started to leave, he
initially stopped her and prevented her from entering her
car.
Mackey left the Air Force in 1994. She alleges that
both Milam and Elmore, who were still on active military
duty, subsequently gave unfavorable assessmentsof her
work to prospective employers.
In 1995, Mackey filed a complaint in Ohio state court
against Milam and Elmore in their individual capacities,
alleging various violations of Ohio common law and of
Ohio’s civil rights statute. The defendants moved for
summary judgment in state court on the basis of
intramilitary immunity, but the state court denied that
motion.
In the spring of 1996, the Department of Justice
authorized representation of Milam and EImore. The
U.S. Attorney filed a certification that the defendants
were acting within the scope of their employment under
the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d)(2). The casewas
removed to federal court with the United States
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substituted as defendant. The case therefore became one
against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FICA”), 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d)(l).
_-_______-_-_______Page 154 FJd 650 follows ____________________
The United States moved to dismiss on the ground that
FTCA claims for injuries that arise incident to military
service are barred by the Feres doctrine. Feresv. United
States, 340 U.S. 13571 S.Ct. 153,95 L.Ed. 152 (1950).
The district court denied the United States’s motion to
.
dismiss and rejected the substitution of the United States
as defendant. On the scope of employment issue, the
court determined that under Ohio law, Milam and
Elmore were not facilitating or promoting the business of
the United States and were therefore not acting within
the scope of their employment. Therefore, Milam and
Elmore were not entitled to have the United States
substituted as defendant. The court noted that the case
had been litigated for some time in state court and
remanded the matter with Milam and Elmore resubstituted as defendants.
In response, the United States filed a Rule 59(e)
motion to alter or amend the judgment. The court
denied that motion in part and granted it in part in an
order dated May 23, 1997. The court refused to revise its
order concerning the scope of employment issue and
rejected the defendants’ alternative argument that they
were entitled to intramilitary immunity. However, the
court did agree that where facts are disputed, the court
must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
the plaintiff has produced sufficient threshold evidence
that the events in question occurred before ruling on the
immunity issue. Therefore, the court vacated its earlier
order and ordered an evidentiary hearing, as requested
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by the United States, for the purpose of determining
whether there was evidence that the acts alleged by
Mackey in her complaint occurred.
The United States appealed and urged this court to
take jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. It
also tiled a motion with the district court to certify the
scope of employment decision for interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b). The district court granted
that motion and framed the question for interlocutory
appeal as follows: “Whether the defendant Air Force
officers were acting within the scope of their employment
under Ohio law when they allegedly engaged in sexual
harassment of the Plaintiff, an Air Force officer who
worked for them.”
II.
[l] Under 28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b), this court may, “in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from” an interlocutory order where the district court has certified that
the order “involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.” Because we agree with the district court that
the scope of employment issue is a controlling question
of law and that resolution of the issue would advance the
litigation, we take jurisdiction of this appeal under 28
U.S.C. $31292(b).’

r Defendants also argue that this court would have
jurisdiction over this appeal under the collateral order
doctrine, even in the absence of the district court’s
certification. However, we decline to reach that
alternative argument.
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III.
[2] [3] [4] A scope certification by the U.S. Attorney
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d)(2) “does not conclusively
establish as correct the substitution of the United States
Statesas defendant in place of the employee,” Gutierrez de
Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417,434, 115 S.Ct. 2227,
132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995) but “providesprima facie
evidence that the employee was acting within the scope
of employment.” Rh4ZTitanium Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1143 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted). Under the Westfall Act, “[wlhether an
employee was acting within the scope of his employment
is a question of law ... made in accordance with the law of
the state where the conduct occurred.” Id. This court
therefore reviews the district court’s determination de
nova. Coleman v. United States, 91 F.3d 820,823 (6th
Cir. 1996).
[5] -l-he district court relied primarily upon the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decision in Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St3d
56,565 N.E.2d
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 154 F&j 651 follows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
584 (1991) a case in which a church pastor was accused
of engaging in nonconsensual sexual conduct with a
member of his congregation. The Ohio court held that
the church could not be held liable under a respondeat
superior theory of liability as the pastor was not acting
within the scope of his employment because his behavior
was not “calculated to facilitate or promote the business
for which the servant was employed.” Id. at 587 (citation
omitted). The district court in this case therefore relied
on Byrd to hold that Milam and Elmore were acting
outside the scope of their employment because sexual
harassment did not facilitate the business of the Air
Force.
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However, the Ohio Supreme Court in a subsequent
case made clear that the rationale of Byrd did not apply
to an employee’s sexual harassment of another employee
over whom he or she had supervisory power. In Kerans v.
Porter Paint Co., 61 Ohio St3d 486,575 N.E.2d 428
(1991), the plaintiff alleged that her direct supervisor had
sexually harassed her during the course of her employment. The court specifically rejected Porter Paint’s
reliance on Byrd and its argument that it could not be
held liable because it did not hire the employee to harass
female employees. Id. at 432.
In determining whether to impose liability
based on respondeat superior on an employer
for the sexually harassing acts of one of its
employees, federal courts have employed
traditional agency principles. Specifically,
they have held that where an employee is able
to sexually harass another employee because
of the authority or apparent authority vested
in him by the employer, it may be said that the
harasser’s actions took place within the scope
of his employment.
Id. (citations omitted). Where the harassment takes
“place during working hours, at the office, and was
carried out by someone with the authority to hire, fire,
promote and discipline the plaintiff,” it will normally fall
within the employee’s scope of employment. Id. (citation
omitted). The Keram court then adopted the above
standard, previously applied by federal courts, and held
that there was a genuine issue as to the harasser’s supervisory powers and that dismissal of the employer was
improper. Id.
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In the instant case, Milam and Elmore had direct
supervisory power over Mackey. Most of the alleged acts
took place during working hours on the base. Moreover,
Milam and Elmore were able to perpetrate the harassment because their employer, the Air Force, had placed
them in a supervisory position. Therefore, they were
acting within the scope of their employment.2
In arguing that Milam and Elmore were acting outside
the scope of their employment, Mackey focuses on at
least two events that do not precisely fit the above
profile. First, she argues that Elmore’s harassment of her
at a local bar was outside the scope of employment
because it occurred off base and after working hours.
However, we find that this isolated incident does not take
Elmore’s actions, as a whole, outside the scope of his
employment. He convinced Mackey to come to the bar
because he said he wanted to discuss her resume. Thus, it
is doubtful that he would have been able to “lure” her to

’ The dissent suggeststhat reliance on Kerans is
misplaced and that this court should instead rely on
Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326,587 N.E.2d 825,829
(1992). In Osborne,which dealt with the liability of a
police department for the actions of an off-duty officer
who assaulted a civilian, the Ohio court stated that, “an
employer is not liable for independent self-serving acts of
his employees which in no way facilitate or promote his
business.” Id. However, that quoted language was taken
from Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 588, which the Ohio Supreme
Court rejected in casesof sexual harassment of an
employee by her supervisor. SeeKerans, 575 N.E.2d at
432.
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the meeting had he not been in a supervisory position
over her.
Mackey also argues that the unfavorable job recommendations given by the defendants after she left the Air
Force take their actions outside the scope of her employment because they were no longer her supervisors.
However, their opinions were solicited because they had
been her supervisors. Therefore, their opinions were
given only because the Air Force had placed them in
positions of authority. The fact that Mackey was no
longer on active duty is irrelevant to the determination.
.a--...-....
Page 154 F-3d 652 follows ------------[6] We conclude that the individual defendants were
acting within the scope of their employment when they
allegedly harassed Mackey. Therefore, the United States
should be substituted as the defendant in this action, and
the matter should not be remanded to the Ohio state
court. Under the Feres doctrine, “the Government is not
liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service.” Feres v. United
States, 340 US. 135, 146,71 S.Ct. 153,95 L.Ed. 152
(1950). Mackey’s allegations go “directly to the ‘management’ of the military; [they call] into question basic
choices about the discipline, supervision, and control of a
serviceman ... and [are], therefore, [ ] allegation[s] about
which we are prohibited from inquiring.” Skeesv. United
States, 107 F.3d 421,424 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United
States v. Shearer,473 U.S. 52,58, 105 S.Ct 3039,87
L.Ed2d 38 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted). See
also Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a claim against the United States for a
servicewoman’s suicide allegedly caused by her drill
sergeant’s sexual harassment was barred by Feres).
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REVERSED and REMANDED
with this opinion.

for action consistent

DISSENT
R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion
because I disagree with its reading of Ohio law and
conclusion that the conduct alleged in this suit falls
within the defendants’ scope of employment. Therefore,
I do not believe that the United States should be
substituted as the defendant in this action.
The majority considers Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 61
Ohio St3d 486,575 N.E.2d 428 (1991), a departure of
sorts from the general principles of Ohio law regarding
scope of employment- and bases its conclusion in this
case on only that one decision. In Kerans, the court
concluded that a jury could find a store manager’s
alleged sexual harassment to be within the scope of his
employment if the manager had supervisory authority
over the plaintiff and used such authority to cause the
plaintiff to feel compelled to endure his conduct in order
to remain employed. Id. at 432. I disagree with the
majority’s conclusion that Kerans is dispositive of the
issue presented in this case. l-he resolution of scope of
employment questions varies from case to case; we are
not bound by one decision’s determination that summary
judgment was not warranted in a particular factual
circumstance.
Although the majority opinion sets out the basic facts
of this case, I have included the district court’s synopsis
of the facts alleged in the complaint, as it presents a
somewhat fuller picture of the conduct and circumstances
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alleged. As taken from the district court’s opinion, the
factual scenario is as follows:
After graduating Tom the University of
Akron, Plaintiff, Dorothy Mackey, became a
commissioned officer in the United States Air
Force. In September 1991, Plaintiff was
assigned as Squadron Section Commander at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WrightPatterson) in Dayton, Ohio. In this position,
Plaintiff reported to and interacted with the
Defendants in this action, Colonel David W.
Milam and Lt. Colonel Travis E.~Elmore. As
Squadron Section Commander, Plaintiff was
responsible for the Weight Management
Program (WMP) and the Cycle Ergometry
Program (CEP), both designed to measure
and ensure the physical fitness and readiness
of military personnel.
Defendant Colonel Milam, retired, served
as Inspector General and Chief of Staff for
the Aeronautical Systems Division of WrightPatterson at the time the alleged incidents
occurred. Defendant Lt. Colonel Elmore
reported to Colonel Milam. His official title
at the time of these incidents was Assistant
Chief of Staff for the Aeronautical Systems
Division and Assistant Inspector General.
Both Defendants were Plaintiffs immediate
supervisors.
Plaintiff alleges various instances of sexual
harassment against both Defendants while she
served as Squadron Section Commander.
These allegations include
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charges of both verbal harassment and
physical contact that, if true, constitute
serious misconduct. Specifically, with regard
to Colonel Milam, Plaintiff alleges that:
(1) While Plaintiff was reporting to Colonel
Milamin his office regarding the WhIP
checks, the Colonel would often close and
lock the door behind Plaintiff, (2) During
these briefings and on several occasions
Colonel Milam would eye Plaintiff from head
to toe and make suggestive remarks such as
“This is what I prefer”; (3) Colonel Milam
would invade Plaintiffs “intimate zone” by
standing so close to her as to enable her to
feel his breath on her face and neck; (4)
Colonel Milam often touched Plaintiff by
placing his hand on her hand or squeezing her
arm while she briefed him on the WMP
program.
Plaintiffs allegations regarding Lt.
Colonel Elmore’s conduct are even more
severe. According to the Complaint, Lt.
Colonel Elmore made it clear early on in the
relationship that he was interested in
Plaintiffs body. He appeared to have had a
particular interest in Plaintiffs breasts, even
going so far as to comment on one occasion
that her erect nipples were “a natural
reaction” from the cold. Lt. Colonel Elmore
repeatedly made inquiries into Plaintiffs
waist size, even taking the liberty of placing
his hands around her waist on more than one
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occasion. Elmore would often make an
approving remark such as, “Very nice--very
nice.,” if Plaintiff were wearing her skirted
uniform, but Elmore allegedly lost interest if
she were wearing the pants uniform. Plaintiff
alleges that over time the Lt. Colonel’s
conduct became increasingly more physical.
Elmore once began to massagethe back of
Plaintiffs neck after it had popped audibly in
his presence. One another occasion, after
Plaintiff had twisted her right knee and was
treated by a physician, Lt. Colonel Elmore
took the opportunity to examine the knee
himself.
Finally, in a truly bizarre and disturbing
event, Plaintiff alleges that Elmore began to
replicate a quasi-pelvic exam on Plaintiff
while in his office. Plaintiff mentioned to
Elmore that she was not feeling well. Lt.
Colonel Elmore allegedly got out of his chair,
walked over to Plaintiff, and placed both of
his hands on her stomach and pressed down.
He began to move his hands down the front of
her pants, with his thumbs up and fingers
wrapped around her back. Elmore continued
to move his hands downward, pressing in on
Plaintiffs abdomen despite her protests.
When the Lt. Colonel got to Plaintiffs pubic
area, Elmore said that she should see a
physician.
All of Plaintiffs allegations, with the
exception of one incident in August 1992,
occurred on the military base during working
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hours. The August incident involved Elmore
allegedly calling Plaintiff at her apartment
around 10:00 p.m. from an off-base night spot
and insisting that she meet him there.
Plaintiff agreed to meet Lt. Colonel Elmore
after he mentioned that he could review her
resume which he had with him. When
Plaintiff arrived, Ehnore was alone and had
placed an order for food. Elmore asked
about her neck and back, and he began
rubbing his hand up and down her back.
Plaintiff claims that on several occasions, his
hand dropped below her waist. After refusing
Lt. Colonel Elmore’s request to dance,
Plaintiff claims she attempted to leave, but
Elmore physically prevented her from
entering her car by leaning against the driver’s
side door. Thirty minutes later, Elmore
finally relinquished, and allowed Plaintiff to
drive home alone.
Mackq v. Milam, No. C-3-96-140, at l-4 (S.D.Ohio Dec.
11,1996).
The majority reasons that Milam and Elmore’s actions
were within the scope of their employment simply
because they had direct supervisory power over Mackey
and because most of the incidents occurred during
working hours. This reasoning is not supported by Ohio
law. In Kerans, the decision upon which the majority
relies, the Ohio Supreme Court did not hold that a supervisor’s sexual harassment of an employee is per se within
a supervisor’s scope of employment by virtue of a supervisor’s ability to sexually harass. Rather, the court held
that if a supervisor used his authority to cause the
subordinate employee to feel compelled to endure his
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advancesin order to keep her job, then a jury could
reasonably find that the supervisor acted within the scope
of his employment. Kerans, 575 N.E.2d at 432.r The
Keram court went on to state that “[e)ven if [the supervisor’s] activities took place outside the scope of employment, summary judgment against appellants’ claims
would not be proper,” noting that the employer may be
liable for failing to take appropriate action if the
employer knows or had reason to lurow that its employee
posed a risk of harm to other employees. 575 N.E.2d at
432. The Kerans decision has been characterized as
holding that “the torts of co-workers predicated upon
sexual harassment are within the scope of employment if
the employer was negligent in not preventing that
malfeasance.” Baab v. AMR ServicesCorp., 811 F.Supp.
1246, 1267 (N.D.Ohio 1993). Thus, the Kerans court did
not rely entirely upon the issue of scope of employment
to conclude that summary judgment was not warranted in
that case.

1 The majority represents that the Kerans Court held that
when the harassment takes place during working hours,
at the office and by someone with the authority to hire,
fire, promote and discipline the plaintiff, “it will normally
fall within the employee’s scope of employment” Seeslip
op. at p. 650. The Kerans Court did not make that
statement. Rather, it summarized a federal district
court’s decision in which there were such circumstances.
SeeKerans, 575 I%!E.2d at 432 (summarizing holding of
Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F.Supp. 774 (S.D.Ohio
1988)).
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I do not believe that Keruns, or Ohio law in general,
suggeststhat all an employee’s acts are within the scope
of employment simply because he is in a supervisory
position which enables him to engage in tortious conduct.
To say such leads to the conclusion that innumerable
tortious acts committed upon lower-ranking employees
by supervisors will be considered within the scope of
employment. In my mind, this reasoning and its
inevitable conclusion defy common sense. The fact that
Elmore and Milam would not have been able to commit
the alleged conduct absent their positions as supervisors
avoids the question presented. It goes without saying
that the conduct would not have occurred if Mackey had
not had an association with the defendants by virtue of
her employment. Our task is to determine whether these
supervisors were acting within their scope of employment
when they engaged in the alleged conduct.
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has more recently
restated its position regarding whether an employee’s
conduct falls within the scope of his employment, albeit
not in the context in which a supervisor was the tortfeasor. See Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St3d 326,587
N.E.2d 825,829 (1992). In Osborne, the Ohio Supreme
Court explained that in order for an employee’s conduct
to be considered within the scope of his employment, “the
behavior giving rise to the tort must be ‘calculated to
facilitate or promote the business for which the servant
was employed....“’ 587 N.E.2d at 829 (citations omitted).
In general, an intentional and willful attack
committed by an agent or employee, to vent
his own spleen or malevolence against the
injured personis a clear departure from his
employment.... Stated otherwise, an employer
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is not liable for independent self-serving acts
of his employees which in no way facilitate or
.promote his business.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted); seealso Henson v.
National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration, 14 F.3d
1143,1147 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that under Ohio law,
“an employee is not acting within the scope of employment if its acts are self-serving and in no way facilitate or
promote business”), amended on rehearing, 23 F.3d 990
(6th Cir. 1994).
Clearly, the conduct alleged here was intended to
neither facilitate nor promote the business of the United
States Air Force. The Air Force does not promote, facilitate or condone sexual harassment; in fact, it has
promulgated regulations prohibiting such conduct. In
Osborne, the Ohio Supreme Court offered further
guidance, drawing on its long-established precedent.
“‘When an employee diverts from the straight and narrow
performance of his task, the diversion is not an abandonment of his responsibility and service to his employer
unless his act is so divergentthat its very character severs
the relalionship of employer and employee.‘“’ Id. at 829
(citations omitted) (emphasis added);
-------------.--... Page 154 FJd 655. follows .._..-------..l.....
Mumford v. Interplast, Inc., 119 Ohio App.3d 724,696
N.E.2d 259,265 (1997) (stating that “an employee is
acting outside the scope of employment where the act has
no relationship to the employer’s business or is so
divergent that its very character severs the employeremployee relationship”). It is clear to me that the nature
of the conduct alleged here is so divergent from the
defendants’ legitimate duties and work activities that it
severed the employer-employee relationship between the
Air Force and the defendants.
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In sum, I believe that the majority improperly extended
the holding of Keram and disregarded other Ohio decisions relevant to determining the issue of whether an
employee’s conduct falls within the scope of his employment. In my view, the majority opinion thus
misconstrues Ohio law. The Kerans decision, upon which
the majority relies, supports the imposition of liability
against a negligent employer by considering the
employer’s potential liability for an employee’s actions.
Here, the majority’s application of Kerans provides for
the opposite result. By considering the defendants’
actions to fall within the scope of their employment, the
majority enables the defendants, as well as their
employer--the United States--to escape liability because
the United States is immune from suit. Plaintiff is thus
left without a remedy for the egregious actions of the
defendants. I do not believe that Ohio law can be
construed to permit such an inequitable result. In my
opinion, the defendants’ conduct was plainly a personal
deviation and not within the scope of their employment
as defined by Ohio law. As a result, the United States
should not be substituted as the defendant in this action.
I would therefore affirm the district court’s reinstatement
of Milam and Elmore as defendants in this action.
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APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES DiSTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRI~ OF OHIO
WESTERN DMSION
Dorothy Mackey,
Plaintic
vs.
David W. Milam, et al.,
Defendants.

: CASE NO. C-3-96-140
:
: Judge Susan J. Dlott
:
: ORDER

This matter is currently before the Court on
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After graduating from the University of Akron,
Plaintiff, Dorothy Mackey, became a commissioned
officer in the United States Air Force. In September
1991, Plaintiff was assigned as Squadron Section
Commander at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
(Wright-Patterson) in Dayton, Ohio. In this position,
Plaintiff reported to and interacted with the Defendants
in this action, Colonel David W. Milam and Lt. Colonel
Travis E. Elmore. As Squadron Section Commander,
Plaintiff was responsible for the Weight Management
Program (WMP) and the Cycle Ergometry Program
(CEP), both designed to measure and ensure the physical
fitness and readiness of military personnel.
Defendant Colonel Milam, retired, served as
Inspector General and Chief of Staff for the Aeronautical SystemsDivision of Wright-Patterson at the time the

alleged incidents occurred. Defendant Lt. Colonel
Elmore reported to Colonel Milam. His official title at
the time of these incidents was Assistant Chief of Staff
for the Aeronautical Systems Division and Assistant
Inspector General. Both Defendants were Plaintiff’s
immediate supervisors. Plaintiff alleges various instances
of sexual harassment against both Defendants while she
served as Squadron Section Commander. These allegations include charges of both verbal harassment and
physical contact that, if true, constitute serious
misconduct. Specifically, with regard to Colonel Milam,
Plaintiff alleges that: (1) While Plaintiff was reporting to
Colonel Milam in his office regarding the WMP checks,
the Colonel would often close and lock the door behind
Plaintiff; (2) During these briefings and on several occasions Colonel Milam would eye Plaintiff from head to toe
and make suggestive remarks such as “This is what I
prefer”; (3) Colonel Milam would invade Plaintiffs
“intimate zone” by standing so close to her as to enable
her to feel his breath on her face and neck; (4) Colonel
Milam often touched Plaintiff by placing his hand on her
hand or squeezing her arm while she briefed him on the
WMP program.
Plaintiffs allegations regarding Lt. Colonel
Elmore’s conduct are even more severe. According to the
Complaint, Lt. Colonel Elmore made it clear early on in
the relationship that he was interested in Plaintiffs body.
He appeared to have had a particular interest in
Plaintiffs breasts, even going so far as to comment on
one occasion that her erect nipples were “a natural
reaction” from the cold. Lt. Colonel Elmore repeatedly
made inquiries into Plaintiffs waist size, even taking the
liberty of placing his hands around her waist on more
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than one occasion. Elmore would often make an
approving remark such as, “Very nice -- very nice,” if
Plaintiff were wearing her skirted uniform, but Elmore
allegedly lost interest if she were wearing the pants
uniform. Plaintiff alleges that over time the Lt. Colonel’s
conduct became increasingly more physical. Ehnore
once began to massagethe back of Plaintiff’s neck after it
had popped audibly in his presence.. On another
occasion, after Plaintiff had twisted her right knee and
was treated by a physician, Lt. Colonel Elmore took the
opportunity to examine the knee himself.
Finally, in a truly bizarre and disturbing event,
Plaintiff alleges that Ehnore began to replicate a quasipelvic exam on Plaintiff while in his office. Plaintiff
mentioned to Elmore that she was not feeling well. Lt.
Colonel Elmore allegedly got out of his chair, walked
over to Plaintiff, and placed both of his hands on her
stomach and pressed down. He began to move his hands
down the front of her pants, with his thumbs up and
fingers wrapped around her back. Ehnore continued to
move his hands downward, pressing in on Plaintiff’s
abdomen despite her protests. When the Lt. Colonel got
to Plaintiffs pubic area, Elmore said that she should see
a physician.
All of Plaintiffs allegations, with the exception of
one incident in August 1992, occurred on the military
base during working hours. The August incident
involved Elmore allegedly calling Plaintiff at her apartment around 10:00 p.m. from an off-base night spot and
insisting that she meet him there. Plaintiff agreed to
meet Lt. Colonel Elmore after he mentioned that he
could review her resume which he had with him. When
Plaintiff arrived, Elmore was alone and had placed an
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order for food. Elmore asked about her neck and back,
and he began rubbing his hand up and down her back.
Plaintiff claims that on several occasions, his hand
dropped below her waist. After refusing Lt. Colonel
Elmore’s request to dance, Plaintiff claims she attempted
to leave, but Elmore physically prevented her from
entering her car by leaning against the driver’s side door.
Thirty minutes later, Elmore finally relinquished, and
allowed Plaintiff to drive home alone,
As a consequence of these alleged incidents,
Plaintiff claims that she was so traumatized as to make
any prospect of working at the base impossible. Plaintiff
claims to have sought the help and support of many, but
to no avail. Plaintiff finally submitted an application for
the early separation program in May of 1992. Plaintiffs
final day of service in the United States Air Force was
September 29,1992.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Colonel Milam
and Lt. Colonel Elmore in their individual capacities in
the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas on
December 5,1994. The case proceeded in the state court
before Judge Gilvary for 16 months until the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio on
April 30, 1996, certified that Colonel Milam and Lt.
Colonel Elmore were acting within the scope of their
employment and, consequently, the United States was
substituted as Defendant. The United States, as
Defendant, filed a notice of removal with this court on
May 1, 1996, almost a year and a half after Plaintiff
originally filed her Complaint in state court. On May 31,
1996 the Plaintiff filed a motion to move this Court to
remand the present action to the Montgomery County
Court of Common Pleas. The United States, on July 12,
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1996, filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint.
Plaintiff prays for relief on the grounds of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, common law sexual
harassment, assault and battery, tortious interference
with contractual relations, tortious interference with
prospective business advantage, sex discrimination
(hostile environment), and wrongful separation
(discharge).
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard of Review Scope Certification
It is well established that when a suit is filed
against a federal employee based upon a tort committed
within the scope of his employment the civil action
against the employee is deemed to be against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (hereinafter
“the Westfall Act”) and the United States is substituted
by operation of law as the sole defendant with respect to
any state law claims. 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d)(l)(2).
The Attorney General has delegated to the
United States Attorney the authority to determine when
federal employees are acting “within the scope of their
employment” for purposes of the Westfall Act. 28 C.F.R.
8 15.3 (1989). On April 30, 1996, the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio certified that
both Colonel Milam and Lt. Colonel Ehnore were acting
within the scope of their employment at the time the incidents giving rise to this suit occurred. The United States
was thus substituted as the true defendant, and this
action was removed to federal court. Defendants then
filed their motion to dismiss.
Just last term the Supreme Court made clear that
a U.S. Attorney’s certification regarding scope of employment does not conclusively decide the matter. Martinez
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v. Lamasmo, 115 SCt. 2227,2236 (1995). The Court
refused to render the federal district courts powerless to
grant anything more than mere mechanical judgments in
support of the United States Attorney’s certification. In
Martinez the plaintiffs, citizens of Colombia, suffered
physical injuries and property damage when an allegedly
intoxicated United States DEA Agent collided into
plaintiffs’ car in Barranquilla, Columbia. Id. at 2229.
The United States Attorney certified that the agent was
acting within the scope of his employment at the time of
the accident. Due to an exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the United States would be immune to suit
were it substituted as defendant for the DEA agent. u
at 2230. With this in mind, the Court held that:
I,. . the Attorney General’s certification that a federal employee was
acting within scope of his employment.
. does not conclusively establish as
correct the substitution of the United
States as defendant in place of the
employee.” J& at 2236.
However, although federal courts are no longer
viewed as “rubber stamps” of executive actions, the Sixth
Circuit has held that a U. S. Attorney’s certification
servesas prima facie evidence that the employee was
acting within the scope of his employment. Coleman v.
United States, 91 F.3d 820,823 (6th Cir. 1996). Whether
an employee was acting within the scope of his employment is a question of law, not fact, made in accordance
with the law of the state where the conduct occurred.
RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 78
F.3d 1125, 1144 (6th Cir. 1996). Hence, under the
Westfall Act, the Court must look to Ohio state law to

-Appx. B6-

determine whether Colonel Milam and Lt. Colonel
Elmore’s actions fell within the scope of their employment
B. Ohio Scope of Employment Law
It is well established in Ohio that under the
doctrine of respondeat superior an employer will be held
liable when an employee commits a tort while he is acting
within the scope of his employment. Bvrd v. Faber, 57
Ohio St3d 56,58 (1990). Where the tort alleged is intentional, the test is whether the behavior giving rise to the
tort is “calculated to facilitate or promote the business for
which the servant was employed.” Tavlor v. Doctor’s
m
21 Ohio App3d 154,156-57 (1985). As outlined
below, Ohio courts have had ample opportunity to
address the issue of what actions fall within the scope of
one’s employment. In general, scope of employment is a
fact specific inquiry, with the court reaching differing
conclusions depending upon the identity and practices of
the defendant, as well as the particular actions alleged.
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that an
employer will not be liable for independent and selfserving acts of his employees which in no way facilitate or
promote the employer’s business. Byrd, 57 Ohio St.3d at
59. In m, the plaintiffs requested that their church
reverend provide their family with needed marital and
personal counseling. During the course of this
counseling, Reverend Faber allegedly forced Mrs. Byrd
to engage in unwanted sexual activity with him. The
Byrds brought action against Reverend Faber and his
employer, the Ohio Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, for inter alia, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and nonconsensual sexual conduct.
u at 586.
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Despite the fact that counseling falls within the
scope of a pastor’s clerical duties, the Supreme Court
held that Reverend Faber acted outside the scope of his
employment by engaging in nonconsensual sexual
conduct with the plaintiff. In upholding the dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ claim against the Church, the Supreme
Court of Ohio focused on the nature of the defendantemployer: “The Seventh-Day Adventist organization in
no way promotes or advocates nonconsensual sexual
conduct between pastors and parishioners.” Id. at 60-61.
In other words, the church could not be held liable for
the independent and self-serving acts of the pastor which
in no way facilitated or promoted the beliefs of the
Seventh-day Adventist organization. The Court was
careful to focus on both the actions complained of and
the identity of the defendant-employer. The Court noted
that the church did not hire the pastor to rape, seduce, or
otherwise physically assault members of the congregation. u at 60. The Court concluded that the Church, as
an institution, could not be held liable for such coercive
and harassing behavior. u
Defendants characterize Byrd as an aberration of
Ohio law and instead rely on an opinion from this
district, Crithfield v. Monsanto Co., 844 F.Supp[.] 371
(S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1994). In Crithfield, the plaintiff
alleged a pattern of harassment by a defendant-coworker which included exposing himself to her, unwelcomed sexual advances,requests for sexual favors,
nonconsensual sexual fondling, and displays of sexually
explicit photographs. I& at 372-373. The court rejected
the employer’s argument that it could not be held liable
for the independent and self-serving acts of its employee.
In an effort to distinguish Byrd. the Honorable Judge
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Speigel noted that them
analysis revolves around the
fact that the defendant was a church, “raising am~~lg
other problems First Amendment ~questions.!’Id. at 374
(emphasis added).
Although the Court agrees with the Defendants
that BJKJ did not create a per se rule that sexual harassment always falls outside the scope of a supervisor’s
employment, the Court cannot conclude that BJTXJis an
aberration. Rather, the two oasesillustrate that Ohio
courts are sensitive to the identity of the defendantemployer and the context in which the allegedly harassing
behavior arose. As C&field readily points out,
churches can be distinguished from private employers.
Most significantly, the harassing conduct displayed in
EJ& is antithetical to the doctrines, teachings, and raison
d’etre of a religious instituti0n.l

1 Defendants rely on Davis v. Black, 70 Ohio App3d 359,
591 N.W.2d 11 (1991) where a parish secretarywas
allegedly harassed by the church’s pastor. The trial court
found that the pastor could not have been acting within
the scope of his employment since sexual harassment fell
outside the duties of a pastor. The Court of Appeals
reversed and distinguished BJTJ along employment and
religious lines:
This case involves the church as an employer
and its responsibility for sexual harassment by
the person to whom it delegated supervisory
(and hiring) authority. Byrd involves the
strictly religious aspects of the church and its
relationship to parishioners (not employees)
and its pastor. u at 365.
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When the Ohio Court of Appeals visited the scope
of employment issue in the context of sexual harassment,
it was found to be of considerable significance that the
defendant-employer was the State of Ohio. Szvdlowski v.
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 79
Ohio App.3d 303,305 (1992). In Szvdlowski, plaintiffs
were female inmates at an Ohio correctional facility who
alleged that they engaged in sexual activity with a certain
state employed psychological aide hired to provide
counseling to inmates. The Court of Appeals found BJTCJ
directly on point and indistinguishable from the facts
before it. I.& at 305. “Like the church, the state does not
promote or advocate sexual conduct, much less
nonconsensual sexual conduct, between its employees
and inmates at penal institutions, nor did it hire the
psychological aide to engage in any type of sexual contact
or conduct with female inmates . . .‘I u at 306.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit has recently had the
opportunity to consider the issue of scope certification
under Ohio law, although not in the context of alleged

(continued)
This Court notes only that Davis deals with the
Church in the context of an employer. Not only is the
identity of the employer a significant consideration in the
court’s analysis, but so are the practices and actions of
that employer. Davis illustrates that the context in which
the alleged sexual harassment occurred is as significant as
the identity of the defendant-employer. The church in
Davis more closely resembled a private entity employer
than the church as an institution. The relationship
between employer and pastor, and pastor and employee
was sufficient enough to impute liability on the church.
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sexual harassment. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit’s
insight proves valuable to the case at hand. In m
Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corn., w
RMI, a federal subcontractor, brought suit against the
Department of Energy (DOE) and one of its employees
for wrongful termination of a government contract
RMI. 78 F.3d at 1125. The Sixth Circuit upheld the
Attorney General’s certification that the DOE employee
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time
of the complained of actions. More importantly for
purposes of the instant case, the Court, in a final
footnote, commented on the type of scope certification
casesrelied upon by RMI:
The casesrelied upon by RMI all deal with
sexual and racial harassment by supervisors
of employee-plaintiffs (and one case involving
the sexual activities of a priest with a
parishioner). Not surprisingly, in these cases,
the courts held that the employee-defendants
were not acting within the scope of their
employment. K at 1144.
The Sixth Circuit recognized that when a plaintiffemployee alleges sexual or racial harassment, the court
should be more willing to find the defendant to be acting
outside the scope of his employment. This would seem
especially appropriate when the alleged sexual harassment occurs in the context of a church or military setting.
C. Analysis
Relying on the reasoning of the casesmentioned
above, the Court believes that the courts of Ohio would
hold that when a commanding military officer sexually
harassesa subordinate while carrying out military duties,
that officer’s actions will be considered outside the scope
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of his employment under respondeat superior principles,
and the United States may not be substituted as
defendant for the officer under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. The Military, like the Church and the State, is an
employer wholly distinguishable horn the private entity
employer. The United States Air Force, or any other
branch of the Armed Services for that matter, in no way
promotes, facilitates, or condones sexual harassment in
any form. The United States Air Force has set forth
extensive regulations that prohibit exactly the kind of
conduct Plaintiff alleges against Defendants here.
Additionally, in light of the recent high profile efforts of
the military to deal with the problem of sexual harassment between commanding officers and subordinates in
the military, it could hardly be said that the United States
Armed Services encourages or advocates that its
members engage in sexual discrimination or harassing
conduct.
As has been discussed, the identity and practices
of the defendant-employer play a prominent role in a
court’s determination of whether the employee was
acting within the scope of his or her employment.
Although m involved a religious institution, the Ohio
Court of Appeals found that “there is no reason to apply
a lesser standard to a claim against the state. . .I’ u at
306. The State in Szvdlowski was likened to the Church
and distinguished from the private entity employer.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has noted that a court
should be more sensitive in the area of scope of employment when a plaintiffs complaint alleges instances of
sexual harassment. Obviously BJXJ does not stand alone
on its facts, and its holding can be extended to the
Military. The Military is a system based, to a large
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degree, upon a rigid hierarchi[c]al command structure.
Military superiors tempted to exploit the vulnerability of
their subordinates should not believe that their sexually
harassing conduct will be protected under the auspices of
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
On the facts alleged in this case, the Court finds
that Defendants’ conduct fell outside the swpe of their
employment at the time the incidents giving rise to this
suit occurred and that the United States may not be
substituted as defendant in this action; Plaintiff has
alleged numerous instances of sexually harassing
behavior and conduct which wntravene.outlined military
procedure. Although all but one of the alleged instances
of harassment and coercion occurred while Colonel
Milam and Lt. Colonel Elmore were on duty, in no way
can their conduct be characterized as calculated to facilitate or promote the business of the United States govemment. The Defendants’ actions can only be seen as independent and self -serving. Plaintiff alleges several counts
of sexual harassment including sexually charged
comments, lascivious stares, inappropriate and unwanted
touching, locking of office doors at private meetings, and
encounters where Plaintiffs “intimate zone” was
invaded. On these facts, the scope of employment test in
Ohio fails to be satisfied. Because the United States Air
Force did not hire Defendants to sexually harass female
subordinates and since such behavior is not condoned by
the Defendants’ employer, the Defendants’ alleged
actions did not occur within the scope of their employment. This suit must now proceed against Colonel
Milam and Lt. Colonel Elmore in their individual
capacity and liability may not be imposed upon the
United States government as the substituted defendant.
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D. Status of Federal Court Jurisdiction
This Court must now decide whether to rule on
Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion and let this action
proceed or to remand the case back to state court for
final determination. Defendants argue that this case
should not be remanded to state court, but should
proceed to final judgment before this Court. Plaintiff
asserts that a case should be remanded to state court
when, contrary to the Attorney General’s certification,
the actions of individual defendants have been found not
to be within the scope of their employment.
Defendants rely heavily on Part IV of the recent
U.S. Supreme Court case of Martinez v. Lamaano, su~ra.
in support for their proposition that no “grave Article III
problem” is raised when a court determines that the
Defendants were not acting within the scope of their
employment. Martinez, 115 S.Ct. at 2236. “Whether the
employee was acting within the scope of his federal
employment is a significant federal question.” &&
Defendants, however, fail to mention that in Martinez
the suit was originally brought in federal court and was
not removed from state court. Here, Plaintiff originally
filed her complaint in a state court which has already
expended a considerable amount of time and resources
on this case. Over a year and a half elapsed between the
filing of Plaintiffs Complaint and the substitution of the
United States as defendant. Judge Gilvary has ruled on
numerous motions and has presided over an in-chambers
pretrial scheduling conference resulting in the issuance of
a Final Pretrial Order and an Amended Pretrial Order.
Unlike in Martinez, the state courts here have a considerable interest in this litigation.
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Furthermore, Part IV of Martinez is not wntrolling on this wurt. In an opinion by a markedly divided
Coufi~Justice O’Connor, the deciding vote, refused to
join Part IV of the decision on the grounds that the
question was not properly presented before the Court.
This left an evenly divided Court with the still undecided
issue of what to do in caseswhere the federal district
court overturns the Attorney General’s swpe of employment certification.
The Sixth Circuit has yet to rule on whether a case
should be remanded to state court or be allowed to
proceed when the district court finds that the Attorney
General’s scope certification is incorrect and resubstitutes the originally named defendant. See, Coleman v.
United States, 91 F.3d 820,822 n.2 (6th Cir. 1996). A
split among the circuits exists on the issue, and decisions
favoring remand include: Nasuti v. Scannell, 906 F.2d
802,814 n.17 (1st Cir. 1990) and Haddon v. United
m,
68 F.3d 1420,1426 (D.C. Cir. 1995). However,
Garcia v. United States, 88 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 1996) and
Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied 510 U.S. 817, 114 S.Ct. 68, 126 L.Ed.2d 37
(1993): both reach the contrary result and find a sufficient basis for federal court jurisdiction. The Court
believes that the casessupporting remand where the
federal district court finds the original defendants to have
been acting outside the scope of their employment to be
the more well reasoned. Therefore, Plaintiffs motion to
remand must be granted and the case remanded to state
court.
E. Conclusion
Based upon a full review of both parties’ briefs,
and for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the
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Defendants did not act within the scope of their employment during the incidents alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint.
Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is remanded
to the state court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/SusanJ. Dlott
Susan J. Dlott
United States District Judge
December lo,1996
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APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRIm OF OHIO
WESTERN DMSION
.

DOROTHY MACKEY,
Plainti&

:
: Case No. C-3-96-140

V.

:District Judge Susan J. Dlott

DAVID W. MILAM,
et al.,

I ORDER GRANTING IN
: PART AND DENYING
: IN PART DEFENDANT’S
: MOTION FOR
: RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s
Motion for Reconsideration (dot. #18) of the Court’s
December 11, 1996 Order (dot. #16). For reasons more
fully set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN
PART AND DENIES IN PART the Defendant’s
Motion.
This matter is also before the Court on
Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings (dot. #19). In
light of this Court’s decision today on the Defendant’s
Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant’s Motion to
Stay Proceedings is hereby DENIED AS MOOT.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case is set forth
fully in this Court’s Order of December 11 (dot. #16).
In the December 11 Order, the Court found that,
assuming the facts in the complaint were true, the named

Defendants, Colonels Milam and Elmore, were not
acting within the scope of their employment when they
engaged in sexually harassing behaviors toward their
subordinate, the Plaintiff, Dorothy Mackey. On January
31, 1991, the Defendant United States of America,’ filed
a Motion for Reconsideration. Specifically, the
Defendant sets forth five grounds upon which judgment
should be amended:
1. The Order fails to decide whether Plaintiffs
case is barred by the doctrine of intramilitary
immunity.
2. The Order improperly applies Ohio law in
deciding whether the Colonels were acting
within the scope of their employment

r Initially, the Court notes that the United States
may not be a party to this action at this time. Both
parties seem to contend that the Court’s December 11
Order did not resubstitute Colonels Milam and Elmore
as Defendants. However, the Court’s December 11
Order specifically states that “[tlhis suit must now
proceed against Colonel Milam and Lt. Colonel Elmore
in their individual capacity and liability may not be
imposed upon the United States government as the
substituted defendant” (dot. #16 at 17). By this
language, the Court resubstituted the Colonels as
Defendants in this action.
However, because the Plaintiff does not seriously
contest the motion on the basis of the status of the
United States as a nonparty, and because the effect of
this Order is to reinstate the United States as a party, the
Court will allow the filing of the Motion to Reconsider by
the United States.
-Appx. C2-
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3. The Order fails to provide a hearing on the
scope of employment issue, as requested by
the United States.
4. The Court failed to Order the resubstitution of
the Colonels as Defendants upon finding that
they were acting outside the scope of their
employment.
5. The Order improperly remands the case to state
COUrt.

Each argument will be addressed in turn.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Doctrine of Intramilitary Immu&y
The doctrine of intramilitaxy immunity was not
addressed in the Court’s December 11 Order because the
doctrine is not dispositive. The Court reviewed Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Judge James J.
Gilvary’s decision on this issue and found the reasoning
persuasive.
Judge Gilvary found the so-called &
doctrine
to be inapplicable to this case for many of the same
reasons that this Court found the Colonels’ alleged acts
not to be within the scope of their employment. Thus,
the Court adopts the reasoning of the Decision, Entry
and Order Overruling in Part and Sustaining in Part
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Case No. 94-4249.2
B. Application of Ohio Law
This point needs little elaboration. The Court’s
December 11 Order cites RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinahouse Electric Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1143 (6th Cir. 1996),

’ The copy filed with the Court does not bear a
date or docket number.
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for the proposition that Ohio law governs in the determination of whether the Colonels were acting within the
scope of their employment. A review of this cited authority reveals that this proposition is explicitly stated by
the Sixth Circuit in RMI Titanium, and no other authority cited in the United States’ Motion compels the
Court to find otherwise.
C. Evidentiary Hearing
The United States next contends that it conditionally requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
whether the Colonels acted within the scope of their
employment. The Plaintiff argues that the United States
agreed in a pretrial conference that no evidentiary
hearing was necessary to determine the scope of employment issue (dot. #20 p.5) and that the Court should
accept as true the allegations contained in the complaint
for the purposes of the motion to dismiss. In its initial
Order, the Court’s recollection mirrored that of the
Plaintiffs and therefore the Court did not order an
evidentiary hearing on the scope of employment issue.
However, an examination of the transcript from
the pretrial conference reveals that the United States
only conditionally agreed to accept as true the allegations
contained in the Plaintiffs complaint. If the Court could
find that the Colonels were acting within the scope of
employment even assuming as true the allegations
contained in the complaint, then the United States was
satisfied to forego its right to an evidentiary hearing. If,
however, the Court were to find that the Colonels were
not acting within the scope of their employment, the
United States would ask for an evidentiary hearing on the
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issue.”

.

Upon reconsideration, the Court finds that the
United States requested an evidentiary hearing if the
Court concluded that the Colonels were acting outside
the scope of their employment, and the Court holds that
the United States is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
this issue. Hueton v. Anderson, 75 F.3d 357,361(8th
Cir. 1996) (finding that where Westfall Act scope of
employment issue is disputed, the district court must
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine all facts
relevant to the immunity question); Arthur v. United
States. 45 F.3d 292,296 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a
district court reviewing Westfall Act certification must
identify and resolve any disputed issues of fact necessary
to its determination of the scope of employment issue);
Kimbro v. Velten, 30 F.3d 1501,1508 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(finding that, where necessary, the district court must
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine scope of
employment issue), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2584 (1995);

s Counsel for the United States stated the
following:
[B]ut I think to a certain extent, if you decide on
the facts that the plaintiff presented that they were
acting outside the scope, then the United States
would request an evidentiary hearing to determine
what actually happened, realizing that, in effect,
[the evidentiary hearing] is going to be the whole
nine yards. It’s going to be basically the trial.
Both counsel for the Plaintiff and counsel for Colonel
Milam indicated understanding of the United States’
statement in their own subsequent statements.
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Melo v. Hafer, 13 F.3d 736,747 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding
that if Westfall Act certification is based on a different
understanding of the facts than that contained in the
complaint, the plaintiff should be allowed discovery and
an evidentiary hearing may be required); Wood v. United
states, 995 F.2d 1122, 1133 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that
where employee denied alleged incidents ever occurred,
district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to decide
whether the incidents occurred.).4
While the Court is not inclined to reconsider the
merits of its determination of the scope of employment at
issue in this case, the Court is inclined to give consideration to the determination of the truth of the factual
allegations set forth in the Plaintiffs complaint upon
which its determination of the scope of employment issue
was based. Upon conclusion of the evidentiary hearing,
the Court will make findings of fact and will apply those

4 The Sixth Circuit authority on the requirement
of an evidentiary hearing on the scope of employment
issue does not directly address whether an evidentiary
hearing is required when the district court determines
that the employee acted outside the scope of his or her
employment. See RMI Titanium, 78 F.3d at 1144 (no
hearing is necessaryif the district court finds that the
employee acted within the scope of employment).
However, the Court can find no instance in which
contested facts were the basis for a finding by the district
court that an employee acted outside the scope of
employment and its own research leads to the inevitable
conclusion that an evidentiary hearing is required in this
case if requested by the United States.
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facts to the rules of law set forth in its December 11
Order. If the Plaintiff proves the allegations contained in
her complaint, then the Colonels kill be resubstituted as
Defendants and the casewill be remanded to state court.
Accordingly, the Court hereby VACATES that
part of its December 11 Order remanding the case to
state court.
D. Order of Resubstitution of Colonels as Defendants
Initially, the Court notes that, contrary to what the
Defendant alleges in its Motion, the Court did order the
resubstitution of the Colonels as Defendants. The
Court’s December 11 Order specifically states that “[tlhis
suit must now proceed against Colonel Milam and Lt.
Colonel Elmore in their individual capacity and liability
may not be imposed upon the United States government
as the substituted defendant.” (dot. #16 at 17). By this
language, the Court resubstituted the Colonels as
Defendants in this action.
However, at this time, the Court hereby
VACATES that part of its decision of December 11
ordering the resubstitution of the Colonels as Defendants
pending discovery by the Plaintiff and the United States,
and pending the evidentiary hearing ordered above.
E. Remand to State Court
The Court agrees that remand to state court prior
to the Court’s findings pursuant to the evidentiary
hearing ordered above is inappropriate. At this time, the
Court hereby VACATES that part of its decision of
December 11 ordering remand of the action to state
court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth and in the manner
outlined above, the Court hereby DENIES IN PART
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AND GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration. In light of the Court’s Order regarding
the Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Court
hereby DENIES AS MOOT the Defendant’s Motion to
Stay Proceedings.
The parties will be contacted to arrange a scheduling conference to set deadlines for discovery in this
matter and to set a date for the evidentiary hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

.
.

s/SusanJ. Dlott
Susan J. Dlott
United States District Judge
Date: 5i21/97

-Appx. CS-

APPENDIX D
IN THE UNITED STATES DiSTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
FILED

.

KFNNETHJ.MlJRPHY
cL.ERK
98 APR 22 PMl2E5
U.S. DISTRICl- COURT
SOUTHERN DIST OHIO
WEST DIV CINCINNATI

Dorothy Mackey,
705 Villa Avenue
Akron, Ohio 44310
Plaintiff,

CIVIL CASE NO.
: C-3-96-140

vs.
David W. Milam,
Travis Elmore,
United States of America
Defendants.

Judge Susan J. Dlott
:
:

_----___-___

ORDER CERTIFYING INTERLOCUTORY DECISION
FOR APPELLATE REVDBV

.

Upon Motion of the United States of America,
David Milam, and Travis Elmore, Defendants, for
Certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 51292(b) of the
following issue in its May 27, 1997 Order:
1. Whether under Ohio law, a supervisor who
engagesin sexual harassment of a subordinate
employee is acting within the scope of his employment.

this Court finds that its order denying Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, deciding that under Ohio law, a
supervisor who engages in sexual harassment of a
subordinate employee is not acting within the scope of
his employment, does involve a controlling question of
law as to which there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal 6om
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 51292(b)
this Court hereby certifies the following question presented by this Court’s Order entered May 27, 1997,
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation:
Whether the defendant Air Force officers were
acting within the scope of their employment under
Ohio law when they allegedly engaged in sexual
harassment of the Plaintiff, an Air Force officer
who worked for them.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/SusanJ. Dlott
SUSAN J. DLOTT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.

) ORDER

DAVID W. MILAM, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
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BEFORE: KRUPANSKY, SILER, and COLE,
Circuit Judges.
The court having received a petition for rehearing
en bane, and the petition having been circulated not only
to the original panel members but also to all other active
judges of this court, and no judge of this court having
requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en bane,
the petition for rehearing has been referred to the
original panel.
The panel has further reviewed the petition for
rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the
petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. Accordingly, the petition is
denied. Judge Cole would grant rehearing for the
reasons stated in his dissent.

ENTERED BY ORDER
OF THE COURT
s/Leonard Green
Leonard Green, Clerk /n
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